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Chapter 1
The Christian Doctrine of 
Religious Liberty
Barrett Duke
R ecently, the United States Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) argued that a Chinese man who had been arrested and beaten in China for operating an unregistered house church could not re-
main in the United States but would have to return to China. The BIA de-
nied his request to remain because it believed that the treatment the man 
received from the Chinese authorities was related to his illegal activity of 
operating an unregistered place of worship, not his religious beliefs.
Essentially, the BIA made a distinction between religious belief and 
religious practice. For them, persecution for religious belief merits pro-
tection, but persecution for religious practice born out of that belief is 
not necessarily protected behavior. The BIA made this decision in spite 
of the fact that it is clear that this man refused to register his church be-
cause he knew the Chinese government would not permit him to teach 
anything contrary to party doctrine. In other words, the Chinese govern-
ment was engaged in restricting religious liberty, and this man consid-
ered the restriction to be a violation of his religious beliefs, which his 
conscience would not allow.
The BIA did not see it that way. They saw only a man who refused 
to obey the law set forth by his government. Incredibly, a three-judge 
panel of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
BIA distinction, arguing, “While we may abhor China’s practice of re-
stricting its citizens from gathering in a private home to read the gospel 
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and sing hymns, and abusing offenders, like Li, who commit such acts, 
that is a moral judgment not a legal one.”1
It is frightening that supposedly enlightened individuals, in signifi-
cant positions of power, could make such erroneous distinctions between 
religious belief and practice. Evidently, it is time to reopen the issue of 
religious liberty and reclarify its meaning for a new generation. While 
many religious groups can claim the right to speak on the topic of reli-
gious liberty because of their own experiences as a persecuted people, 
Baptists approach this topic from their own uniquely qualified position. 
Baptists, as a distinct group, lived and died through more than two cen-
turies of religious persecution. In fact, their earlier spiritual brethren, the 
Anabaptists, were among the first to speak out against the Reformers’ 
use of the power of the state to punish those whose religious practices 
were at odds with their own beliefs.2
While the persecution dilemma has subsided in this country with the 
cessation of the official state church, people of faith are finding a new 
intolerance of their faith and their convictions born of that faith with 
the emergence of fundamentalist secularism in the West. Furthermore, 
in many areas in the rest of the world, persecution for religious faith 
remains a serious and deadly problem for millions of people of faith, 
especially, but not limited to, Christians.
Religious liberty is threatened on at least four fronts today.
First, a new religious fundamentalism has gripped many countries 
where it is bringing the power of the state to its aid in suppressing those 
of other faiths or even different sects of the same faith. The rise of reli-
gious fundamentalism among Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists around 
the world—coupled with the direct assistance, sympathy, or apathy of 
the civil powers—has made the issue of religious liberty one of the 
1. Xiaodong Li v. Alberto Gonzalez, 420 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2005). This decision was ap-
pealed subsequent to the delivery of this paper in September 2005. Due to significant pressure 
from the religious and human rights communities on the Department of Homeland Security, 
DHS petitioned BIA to reopen its removal proceedings against Li. On October 6, 2005, BIA 
reversed its previous decision and granted Li permission to remain in the United States. On 
November 1, 2005, the Fifth Circuit panel responded by vacating its previous decision, and Li 
was not forced to return to China.
2. Harold Bender notes that the Anabaptist Balthasar Hubmaier’s 1528 pamphlet, Von ketzern 
und iren verbrennern, “has been called the first Protestant declaration for religious freedom.” 
Harold S. Bender, Anabaptists and Religious Liberty in the Sixteenth Century (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1970), 9.
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most pressing concerns of the last decades of the twentieth century and 
the first decade of this century.
Second, religious liberty is threatened in some countries by certain 
Christ-confessing groups that believe in the superior nature of their sect 
or who consider other Christ-confessing groups as nuisances or threats 
to their dominance—in the former Soviet countries, for example.
Third, the world’s remaining totalitarian states still see religious be-
lief as a threat to the state’s dominance of every aspect of life. China still 
imprisons, tortures, and murders Christians who choose to follow the 
dictates of their conscience in matters of faith. North Korea’s attitude 
toward unsanctioned religious groups is even more brutal.
Fourth, but probably not finally, a fundamentalist secularism has 
emerged in many countries that considers the church’s denouncement 
of certain sins to be unacceptable. A growing movement is afoot to label 
certain religious speech—speech against homosexuality for example—
as hate speech. In response, these people have begun to marshal the 
civil powers to restrict and punish undesirable religious speech. In other 
quarters a new militancy against the involvement of people of faith in 
political life is emerging such that moral convictions are being equated 
with religious beliefs and deemed an unconstitutional intrusion of faith 
in the body politic.
As the church seeks to speak to these new and old threats to re-
ligious liberty, she must also contend with a postmodern mind-set 
among Western intellectual elites that no longer believes in absolute 
moral truth. This abandonment of the concept of absolute moral truth 
has led many people to question whether any culture can demand cer-
tain behaviors of any other culture. After all, if one accepts the post-
modern model that each community constructs its own reality, and that 
one community’s construction of reality and its attendant absolutes are 
as valid as another’s, within certain humanitarian boundaries, then it 
is nearly impossible for someone from one community to insist that 
another community change. The problems postmodernism creates for 
those who are attempting to promote religious freedom throughout the 
world are immense. Just consider the scope of postmodernism’s reach. 
Gene Veith provides a superb summary of its tenets:
 1. Social Constructivism. Meaning, morality, and truth do not exist 
objectively; rather, they are constructed by the society.
Barrett Duke
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 2. Cultural Determinism. Individuals are wholly shaped by cultural 
forces. Language in particular determines what we can think.
 3. The Rejection of Individual Identity. People exist primarily as 
members of groups. Identity is primarily collective.
 4. The Rejection of Humanism. Values that emphasize the creativity, 
autonomy, and priority of human beings are misplaced. There is no 
universal humanity since every culture constitutes its own reality.
 5. The Denial of the Transcendent. There are no absolutes.
 6. Power Reductionism. All institutions, all human relationships, all 
moral values, and all human creations—from works of art to reli-
gious ideologies—are all expressions and masks of the primal will 
to power.
 7. The Rejection of Reason. Reason and the impulse to objectify truth 
are illusory masks for cultural power. Authenticity and fulfillment 
come from submerging the self into a larger group.
 8. Revolutionary Critique of the Existing Order. Modern society with 
its rationalism, order, and unitary view of truth needs to be replaced 
by a new world order.3
The implications of these tenets for religious liberty are obvious. If 
our concept of religious liberty is merely a construct of our community 
but not universally valid for the myriad reasons suggested in the above 
postmodern tenets, then the postmodernist will argue that this is a rela-
tive value and not binding on all cultures.
This is the environment with which people of faith must contend 
today. As Christians relate to these various pressures, we can respond 
in one of two general ways. We could accept the postmodern construct 
and simply write off people of faith being persecuted by other cultures 
and take a Star Trekkian “prime directive” attitude toward them. Or we 
could reassert the universal nature of religious liberty and insist that all 
cultures, our own as well as others, respect the faith of the various faith 
groups in their midst and protect them and their right to practice their 
faith as they choose, within reason, of course, including their right to 
engage in religious speech and the life of their community and nation.
The first option is hardly acceptable. To sit idly while people are 
murdered, raped, imprisoned, dispossessed, displaced, and margin-
3. Gene Edward Veith Jr., Postmodern Times: A Christian Guide to Contemporary Thought 
and Culture (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 1994), 158.
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alized because of their faith is an act of cowardice tantamount to the 
barbaric acts themselves. The second option is the only responsible op-
tion. However, it seems necessary to regain some lost ground in order 
to press the cause of religious liberty around the world, as well as in our 
own nation. Of foremost concern must be the ideological basis for this 
“interference” and advocacy on behalf of persecuted people of faith. A 
number of approaches can be taken to establish the ideological ground 
for universal religious liberty.
First, one may argue the case from natural law. Proponents of natu-
ral law theory argue that universal moral absolutes are deduced by ob-
serving the created order or human behavior and social systems. While 
natural law theory has seen its share of triumphs and defeats, it still 
provides a solid footing for many. The recent work by J. Budziszewski, 
What We Can’t Not Know, promises to reassert the importance of this 
approach to moral values in general and, consequently, to the case for 
religious liberty in particular. Budziszewski does not argue that people 
know moral law inherently, as though they are born knowing it. He 
argues that a morality is inherent in the created order and that humans 
cannot prevent themselves from learning it. Four evidences or “wit-
nesses” are at work in every human that “provide real moral knowl-
edge.” These “witnesses” are: deep conscience, design as such, our 
own design, and natural consequences.
Budziszewski does an excellent job in a brief space of demonstrating 
how these witnesses lead to the understanding of certain moral truths. 
However, he has not proven whether men discover these moral laws or 
produce them in response to these inner witnesses. He even admits this 
failing: “I have not proven that they do; I have only declared it. There 
is no way to prove the obvious.”4 But even if one were to assume he 
need not prove that these moral laws are already present, there is yet an-
other problem with natural law theory. Whether people discover certain 
moral truths or produce them, there is no certainty that they will come 
to the right moral conclusions as they respond to the “witnesses.” It is 
expected that they will, and fortunately, they usually do; but left to their 
own faulty reasoning capacities, they are likely going to miss something 
at the very least.
4. J. Budziszewski, What We Can’t Not Know: A Guide (Dallas, Tex.: Spence, 2003), 
103.
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Natural law theory eventually succumbs to the same argument op-
posing postmodern formulations of moral values; it is dependent on the 
reasoning capacity of the individual or collective. Unfortunately, pure 
objective reasoning is not easy to achieve or maintain. In most cases a 
person’s cultural exposure affects his deductive reasoning. A perfect ex-
ample can be found in a later section of Budziszewski’s volume where 
he answers the objections that people raise to natural law arguments. 
At one point he notes that people discount the credibility of natural law 
arguments because some of its proponents have been wrong about what 
they considered to be natural laws. For example, one of the greatest 
natural law proponents of all time, Aristotle, among many others, ar-
gued that slavery was natural. To this Budziszewski retorts rather glibly, 
“They were wrong.”5 Yes, Aristotle and the others were wrong, but they 
were preconditioned by their own experiences, cultures, and limitations 
to arrive at their conclusion.6
The question this example begs from us is, why should we believe 
Budziszewski or anyone else is right on every count? And when are they 
right, and when are they wrong? Carl F. H. Henry responded to these 
same concerns:
The sin-warped predicament of man in whom God’s cre-
ation-image is now flawed raises questions also about a 
body of commonly or universally perceived ethical im-
peratives. It is not in question that humans are confronted 
in general divine revelation by the will of the Creator, and 
that such revelation contains both formal and material ele-
ments. What is in question is the ability of sinful humanity 
to translate the moral revelation into a universally shared 
body of ethical truth. If, as champions of natural moral-
ity insist, human nature is inherently structured with im-
peratives, how can humans know that these requirements 
are ethically legitimate? . . . The predicament of man in 
sin includes a propensity for perversion of religious real-
5. Ibid., 108.
6. In his defense, Budziszewski admits humans may not know these moral truths “with un-
failing perfect clarity, or that we have reasoned out their remotest implications: we don’t, and 
we haven’t.” That is the point, however. How can we know when we have attained “perfect 
clarity” or the “remotest implications”? Future generations, or other cultures, can always argue 
that current moral formulations are either incomplete or mistaken. Ibid., 19.
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ity. What humanity affirms solely on the basis of inher-
ent instincts and philosophical reasoning lacks normative 
force; only what God says in Scripture and has disclosed 
in Christ is normative.7
Second, one may also take a strictly humanist approach to the ques-
tion. In this case, the issue isn’t so much whether certain moral abso-
lutes are part of the warp and woof of the natural world but whether 
men must choose to adopt a certain universal morality simply to be 
able to form a brotherhood of man that respects all men. The Humanist 
Manifesto 2000 takes this approach.8 The author of the Manifesto rec-
ognizes that postmodernism has destroyed the notion of universal ab-
solutes. Consequently, there is no longer a solid foundation for arguing 
for certain shared moral values from natural law. However, because men 
must respect a certain moral code if they ever hope to live together in 
peace, the author appeals to his readers to adopt his proposed set of 
moral values as a reasonable approach to civil life together.
The question this approach raises is, of course, why should anyone 
accept this set of values? The values are based on the author’s percep-
tion of the way things ought to be, but they have no authoritative basis 
beyond the strength of the arguments used to promote them. One can 
easily dismiss the author’s proposal as a product of a particular culture 
and reject the Manifesto’s system as inferior to his own.
The third approach is to argue for a theological basis for religious 
liberty. In this case religious liberty will be said to rest on the founda-
tion of deity itself. Given the severe weaknesses of the other two op-
tions, I believe the most dependable foundation for the promulgation 
of a doctrine of religious liberty is deity. However, this proposal has 
some obvious shortcomings. First, not everyone accepts the same deity. 
Because I happen to believe in the God revealed in the Bible, this does 
not make my belief in him or my subsequent conclusions based on that 
belief legally binding on anyone else. The second problem with this ap-
proach is the need for an authoritative source that reveals unerringly the 
thoughts of this deity.
7. Carl F. H. Henry, “Natural Law and Nihilistic Culture,” First Things 49 (1995): 59.
8. Paul Kurtz, Humanist Manifesto 2000: A Call for a New Planetary Humanism (Amherst, 
N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2000).
Barrett Duke
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I resolve both of these problems for myself by appealing to the per-
son of Jesus Christ as he is revealed in the Bible. His message, actions, 
miracles, and life demonstrate a believability that satisfies my need for 
verification of his deity. Others must either show that their deity is as 
believable or give serious consideration to the claims of Jesus Christ and 
the moral values that naturally follow from that belief. I resolve the is-
sue of an authoritative source by starting with Jesus Christ. His supreme 
confidence in the veracity and inerrancy of the Hebrew Scriptures in-
stills confidence that I can trust those texts to reveal the mind of God. 
The New Testament texts are another issue, of course. However, these 
texts have withstood the scrutiny of the critics, bear the marks of men of 
integrity and veracity, and have the support of two millennia of church 
history such that they also pass the authority test.
In this chapter we will follow the theological approach to the question 
of religious liberty. Our task is to present a biblical doctrine of universal re-
ligious liberty that will by its very nature establish religious liberty as a fun-
damental, universal, human right. The difficulty, of course, is that nowhere 
in Scripture does God say, “I want all people to be free to worship or not 
to worship whatever they want.” In fact, scholars are pretty much in agree-
ment that such a doctrine of religious liberty is not immediately identifiable 
in Scripture. Luke Johnson comments, “The Christian Scriptures, in short, 
do not in any direct or obvious way provide support for the contemporary 
proposition that ‘it is a human right to be religious.’”9
Consequently, we are left asking if this is what God wants. While 
direct references to religious liberty are lacking, there are sufficient im-
plications in the major theological doctrines of the Christian faith to 
demonstrate that God has granted mankind the freedom to choose who 
or what he wants to worship in the way that he pleases.10
9. Luke Johnson, “Religious Rights and Christian Texts,” in Religious Human Rights in Global 
Perspective: Religious Perspectives, ed. John Witte Jr. and Johan van der Vyver (Boston: M. 
Nijhoff, 1996), 66.
10. This has been recognized elsewhere, perhaps in fuller and more eloquent ways. Certainly 
one of the greatest statements on the foundations of religious liberty, natural and theological, is 
the Vatican “Declaration on Religious Freedom,” adopted on December 7, 1965. The declara-
tion noted, “Revelation does not indeed affirm in so many words the right of man to immunity 
from external coercion in matters religious. It does, however, disclose the dignity of the human 
person in its full dimensions. It gives evidence of the respect which Christ showed toward the 
freedom with which man is to fulfill his duty of belief in the Word of God.” The declaration 
itself, while arguing for religious liberty principally from natural law theory, includes a chapter 
entitled “Religious Freedom in the Light of Revelation” in which it demonstrates that the Bible 
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J. D. Hughey, former president and professor of church history at the 
Baptist Theological Seminary in Ruschlikon, Switzerland, took this ap-
proach. He agreed that “religious liberty is not a truth explicitly revealed 
in Scripture.” He continued, however, that “religious liberty is implicit 
in Christian teaching” and then provided a succinct, well-argued case 
for religious liberty from the doctrines of God, man, Christ, salvation, 
and the church. He followed that by developing an ethic of religious 
liberty built on man’s creation in the image of God, the “fundamental 
Christian teaching of love,” and the Golden Rule.11
This chapter, of course, is indebted to Professor Hughey, and others, 
for their careful work on this important topic.12 We begin by looking at 
the doctrine of man, beginning with his creation. The book of Genesis 
states that God created man in his image (Gen. 1:27). Theologians have 
many opinions about what it means to be created in the image of God. 
While many of these suggestions seem credible, absolute certainty is 
not possible. About all that can be said is that the phrase does not refer 
to a physical similarity. The Bible teaches that God does not have a 
specific physical form (Deut. 4:15–18). If God does not have a physical 
form, then there is no physical image to replicate in man.
The other certainty is that only humanity possesses this image. 
Nothing else in creation is said to be created in God’s image. Evidently, 
this image is fundamental to what it means to be human. It separates us 
from all of the rest of creation. While we cannot state categorically what 
this image entails, we do understand that it means that humans possess 
something of the divine that nothing else in creation possesses. What we 
must also recognize is that all humans possess this image to the same 
degree. There are not greater and lesser image bearers. Consequently, 
there are no superior people in the eyes of the Lord. Scripture states, 
“There is no partiality with God” (Rom. 2:11).
Given this truth, it would be inappropriate for someone to claim 
that he possesses an inherent spiritual superiority that entitles him to 
teaches the principle of religious liberty. The document affirms, “What is more, this doctrine 
of freedom has its roots in divine revelation.”
11. J. D. Hughey, “The Theological Frame of Religious Liberty,” Christian Century 80 
(November 6, 1963): 1365–68.
12. I am indebted to the research assistance of Andrew Lewis, a summer intern in the 
Washington, D.C. office of the Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission and student of 
Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary in Wake Forest, N.C., whose efforts to gather rel-
evant materials for this paper were invaluable.
Barrett Duke
★ 16 ★
 suppress another’s spiritual freedom. All people bear the same image of 
the divine; therefore, all have equal spiritual status before God.
There are four areas where one might choose to disagree with this 
statement. First, one may argue that the scriptural offices of pastor and 
deacon involve the exercise of spiritual authority over others. This is 
true, but this authority is not inherent in the individuals holding these 
offices. It is the result of the calling of God. Furthermore, pastors and 
deacons are responsible to enforce God’s spiritual standards, not their 
own. But even this exercise of authority has its limits. Pastors and dea-
cons are not authorized to be dictators over their congregations, nor are 
they authorized to force spiritual conformity in others. Peter instructed 
elders, or pastors, to “shepherd God’s flock among you, not oversee-
ing out of compulsion but freely, according to God’s will; not for the 
money but eagerly; not lording it over those entrusted to you, but being 
examples to the flock” (1 Pet. 5:2–3).
Second, one can argue that if there is no such thing as a spiritually 
superior person, parents would not have the right to exercise spiritual 
authority over their children. To an extent this is true. Parents are au-
thorized by God to guide their children spiritually not because they are 
spiritually superior but because they have been tasked by God to impart 
his spiritual values to them (Deut. 6:4–8; Prov. 22:6). However, not even 
a parent can force a child to believe. A parent can coerce compliance 
and outward conformity to his religious beliefs and practices, but he 
cannot make the spirit of the child accept these things.
Third, one could argue that the state has authority over men. This 
authority has been granted by God (Rom. 13:1–7). But there is no evi-
dence that this authority is supposed to extend to spiritual matters. This 
issue is developed further below when we discuss the difference be-
tween Israel and all other political entities.
Fourth, some would argue that a husband exercises spiritual author-
ity over his wife. But this is an incorrect view of spiritual headship. 
Headship entails responsibility for the physical, emotional, and spiri-
tual well-being of the family, which of course includes the wife, but 
nowhere in Scripture is it said that the husband is the spiritual superior 
of the wife. Paul said that in matters relating to God, there is neither Jew 
nor Greek, slave nor freeman, male nor female (Gal. 3:28). All people, 
including husbands and wives, enjoy religious liberty. The husband is 
responsible to see to it that his wife has opportunity for spiritual growth 
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and worship, but he does not have the authority to force her to mature 
spiritually, to worship, or to believe.
We gain further insight on the doctrine of religious liberty from the 
fall. In Genesis 2:16–17, God told the man and the woman that they 
were free to eat from any tree in the garden except for the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil. This instruction implies that God had given 
these first humans significant latitude in their choices. He created them 
as free moral agents. They were given a will capable of choosing wheth-
er to obey God. Their subsequent choice to disobey (Gen. 3:1–7) reveals 
the reality of this liberty.
One can see in this event a significant freedom in religious mat-
ters granted to our original parents. God put them in the garden, sur-
rounded them with all they could need, and then gave them the freedom 
to choose his way or their own. As we are well aware, they chose their 
own way. From that moment on, the biblical story depicts God’s ac-
tivity calling men and women back to himself and his plan to redeem 
them. Yet not once do we find that God violated humanity’s freedom to 
choose between their own sinful ways and God. Granted, he resorted 
to considerable instruction and punishment (for example, the flood and 
the forty years of wilderness wandering), but people were still free to 
choose their spiritual path.
There is yet more to be learned about religious liberty from the fall. 
Fallen man is incapable of fully interpreting the will of God in all mat-
ters for other people, and he is certainly incapable of properly enforc-
ing spiritual standards. Fallen man’s propensity for cruelty and merci-
less retribution, too often in the name of just causes, provides a strong 
argument for religious liberty. Jeremiah declared, “The heart is more 
deceitful than all else and is desperately sick” (Jer. 17:9). Cain feared 
that his sin would be a cause of retribution from anyone who met him, 
which was evidently more than God required. In response God took the 
unusual step of providing assurance that men would not require more 
than he had already exacted (Gen. 4:9–16). James Wood summarizes 
this principle eloquently. He comments, “The sinful nature of man ne-
gates the possibility of the absolutizing of human authority, religious 
or political, and by limiting all human authority provides an important 
foundation for religious liberty.”13
13. James E. Wood Jr., “A Biblical View of Religious Liberty,” The Ecumenical Review 30 
(Jan. 1978): 37.
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God’s respect for individual choice carries over to the church as well. 
In the book of Revelation, Jesus chided the church at Laodicea for their 
severe spiritual failings (3:14–22), declaring them lukewarm (3:16). 
Yet in spite of the Lord’s obvious disappointment with the Laodicians, 
he still did not call for any external compulsion to force their change. 
Instead, he called on them to be zealous and repent, and then issued his 
amazing invitation: “Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone 
hears My voice and opens the door, I will come in to him” (Rev. 3:20). 
Even here Jesus’ respect for human choice would not allow him to co-
erce change. He appealed to the believers to make their own decision 
to change.
God’s attitude toward man’s freedom of choice highlights an es-
sential aspect of faith. Faith is ultimately an internal matter. Coercion 
can produce external compliance to a set of behavioral standards, but it 
cannot produce a change in mind. Brainwashing can produce a desired 
response, but it does not represent the true opinion of a person. It is an 
overlay that turns the victim into a mindless drone. Evidently, God did 
not desire this kind of person, or he would have created humans with 
the right mind-set toward him and made it impossible for them to hold a 
contrary opinion. Since God so highly values individual choice, it seems 
unlikely that he would designate any other individual or institution to 
exercise power over that which he himself has left inviolable.
Ultimately, religious liberty is about man’s conscience. The con-
science is the crucial internal guide to moral judgment in the New 
Testament. H. C. Hahn writes of the conscience: “Conscience ap-
pears—to put it graphically—as a court of appeal which is not able to 
promulgate any statutes (for only God himself can do this) but is able to 
deliver judgment on the cases before it.”14 Paul spoke of the conscience 
of the unbelieving Gentiles that was capable of directing them to obey 
the law written on their hearts (Rom. 2:14–15). He also spoke of the 
conscience as the judge of his own moral life (Rom. 9:1). Paul trusted 
that other people’s consciences would testify to the truthfulness of his 
message (2 Cor. 4:2). Hahn concludes, “The conscience can be regarded 
as the place where the ‘mystery of faith’ is to be found (1 Tim. 3:9).”15
14. H. C. Hahn, “Conscience,” in The New International Dictionary of New Testament 
Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1975), 1:350.
15. Ibid., 351.
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Conscience is the inviolable witness within each person that in-
structs him about his moral accountability. Johnson asserts that Paul 
referred to the conscience as the guiding principle in his instructions 
to other Christians on the question of diversity of practice. The cases 
involved questions about whether believers could eat meat that had been 
offered at pagan shrines and whether they could take part in meals at 
pagan shrines (1 Cor. 8–10). Johnson notes that Paul’s answer focuses 
on the individual’s perception of things, not the objective facts of the 
case. He observes that “proper behavior depended on the circumstances, 
and the discernment of the circumstances in turn was the business of 
the individual’s conscience.” A person either follows its leadings and 
experiences harmony within himself, or he refuses its guidance and ex-
periences condemnation. The conscience is a realm of moral guidance 
unique to each person, and Paul taught that it was inviolable. No one is 
to create a situation in which he offends or interferes with an individual’s 
conscience.16 Consequently, Johnson concludes that human conscience 
“provides the fundamental ground for religious liberty.”17
The centrality of liberty of conscience in matters of faith seems to 
have first appeared in literary form in a 1612 confession of faith re-
ferred to as “Propositions and Conclusions concerning True Christian 
Religion, containing a Confession of Faith of certain English people, 
living at Amsterdam.” W. L. Lumpkin suggests that the document may 
have been a modification of a confession written in Dutch by John 
Smyth, a principal leader in what would become the General Baptist 
church.18 This confession states: 
That the magistrate is not by virtue of his office to 
meddle with religion, or matters of conscience, to force 
or compel men to this or that form of religion, or doc-
trine: but to leave Christian religion free, to every man’s 
conscience, and to handle only civil transgressions (Rom. 
16. Wood comments, “Persons are to be free in matters of conscience and religion, without 
hindrance or coercion, first and foremost in order that God may be sovereign of their lives and 
that in turn they may freely respond to that sovereignty and bring about the ordering of their 
lives according to the will of God.” Wood, “A Biblical View of Religious Liberty,” 35.
17. Johnson, “Religious Rights,” 89.
18. W. L. Lumpkin, Baptist Confessions of Faith, rev. ed. (Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson, 1969), 
123. Estep speaks with more certainty about this. He says that Smyth “can be considered the 
author.” W. R. Estep, Religious Liberty: Heritage and Responsibility (Newton, Kans.: Bethel 
College, 1988), 37.
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xiii), injuries and wrongs of man against man, in murder, 
adultery, theft, etc., for Christ only is king and lawgiver of 
the church and conscience (James iv. 12).19
Lumpkin credits the confession as “perhaps the first confession of 
faith of modern times to demand freedom of conscience and separation 
of church and state.”20
Freedom of conscience was a key issue in Roger Williams’s argu-
ments for religious liberty. In his 1644 tractate, “The Bloudy Tenent of 
Persecution,” Williams made the matter of conscience a central theme. 
It is the will and command of God that, since the com-
ing of His Son the Lord Jesus, a permission of the most 
paganish, Jewish, Turkish, or anti-christian consciences 
and worships be granted to all men in all nations and 
countries, and they are only to be fought against with that 
sword which is only, in soul matters, able to conquer, to 
wit, the sword of God’s Spirit, the word of God.
Williams also avowed, “God requires not a uniformity of religion to 
be enacted and enforced in any civil state; which enforced uniformity, 
sooner or later, is the greatest occasion of civil war, ravishing of con-
science, persecution of Christ Jesus in his servants, and of the hypocrisy 
and destruction of millions of souls.”21
In 1773, Isaac Backus offered a similar opinion: 
God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free 
from the doctrines and commandments of men, which are, 
in any thing contrary to his word; or not contained in it; so 
that to believe such doctrines, or to obey such commands, 
out of conscience, is to betray true liberty of conscience; 
and the requiring of an implicit faith, and an absolute 
blind obedience, is to destroy liberty of conscience and 
reason also.22
19. Lumpkin, Baptist Confessions, 140.
20. Ibid., 124.
21. Roger Williams, “The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience,” in Roger 
Williams, ed. Richard Groves (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2001), 3.
22. Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty, Against the Oppressions of 
the Present Day (Boston: John Boyle, 1773), 56.
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The theological doctrine of man sheds further light on the doctrine 
of religious liberty. In Paul’s great sermon to the Areopagus in Athens, 
he acknowledged that God created man with a capacity to seek him. 
He said that God “made from one man, every nation of mankind to live 
on all the face of the earth . . . that they would seek God, if perhaps 
they might grope for Him and find Him” (Acts 17:26–27 NASB). Paul 
asserted that God wanted all men to seek him and find him. It seems 
reasonable to deduce from this truth that God intended men to have the 
freedom to search for him.
Unquestionably, this search would result in false formulations of 
faith, yet Paul intimated that this was just part of the search process. 
Men had to search out questions of faith in order to come to the end 
of their own efforts and be prepared to accept the truth when it ap-
peared. Luke Johnson’s reflections on this passage led him to conclude 
that Paul’s statement is “remarkably positive toward the legitimacy of 
Gentile religious longing.”23
Additional confirmation of the God-given right of religious liberty 
is available in the doctrine of Christ. Jesus provides a perfect example 
of God’s respect for religious liberty. Throughout his ministry, Jesus 
respected the right of every person to choose or reject him. He even 
came in the form of a servant rather than a king (Matt. 20:25–28; Phil. 
2:5–8). As a servant he pointed people to God and faith, but he is never 
depicted as coercing faith. Scripture relates many examples of this at-
titude, but a prime example is Jesus’ lament over the city of Jerusalem. 
He declared, “O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the city that kills the prophets 
and stones those sent to her! How often I wanted to gather your chil-
dren together, just as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you 
would not have it” (Luke 13:34). Here Jesus acknowledged his desire 
to see Jerusalem embrace him, yet he did not force them to accept him. 
This is all the more significant when we recognize that, as God, he had 
the power to make people do anything. Nevertheless, he chose a very 
different approach.
He revealed that approach in his parable of the wheat and tares 
(Matt. 13:24–30). In the parable the wheat symbolized true believers, 
and the tares symbolize unbelievers. When the servants in the parable 
asked their master if they should go and uproot the tares, the master 
replied, “Allow both to grow together until the harvest” (Matt. 13:30). 
23. Johnson, “Religious Rights,” 87.
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In this parable Jesus made clear that he does not want unbelievers to be 
rooted out for their unbelief. That will happen in God’s time.
The doctrine of salvation itself contributes to our understanding of 
God’s design for religious liberty. Salvation is an individual, spiritual 
event. It is a matter of the will. Scripture shows the apostles preaching, 
even pleading with people to trust Christ as Savior, but it never shows 
them violating the right of the individual to choose or reject their mes-
sage, and ultimately salvation. In fact, the individual nature of salvation 
requires religious liberty. People must be free to respond to the gospel. It 
is unlikely that God would have ordained an institution that would have 
been by design opposed to the freedom of people to make decisions in 
matters of faith. To have designed humans to seek him and find him, and 
then to ordain an institution with the power of life and death to restrict 
them from this search, would be equivalent to creating people with a need 
for water and then not providing any water to drink.24
The doctrine of the church holds additional important keys to de-
veloping a biblical understanding of religious liberty. The church is not 
a governmental entity. It is a spiritual entity. It has not been given the 
means to exercise control over those outside the faith. Consequently, the 
church cannot dictate to others on matters of faith. Scripture teaches that 
God established three institutions—the family, the church, and govern-
ment. The family is the foundational social structure which nourishes its 
members physically, emotionally, mentally, and spiritually, to provide a 
citizenry capable of fulfilling God’s design for creation. Civil govern-
ment is the institution charged with maintaining civil order. According 
to Paul it is God’s minister to reward good behavior and punish evil be-
havior (Rom. 13:1–5). The church is God’s spiritual institution. Its task 
is to provide a structure for Christian ministry and spiritual maturity.
Each of these institutions has its distinct tasks. While the institu-
tions share some responsibilities, none of them are designed to fulfill 
the God-given purposes of the other. For example, the family and the 
church share a common responsibility for the spiritual development of 
others, but the church is not a substitute for the family. The father is the 
one responsible for the spiritual development of the family. The church 
is there to assist him in that task. Similarly, the church is tasked with the 
24. J. D. Hughey remarked concerning this that “no earthly power has the right to enforce 
obedience to God, since his authority over the spirit of man has not been delegated.” Hughey, 
“The Theological Frame of Religious Liberty,” 1365.
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responsibility to share the gospel throughout the world. In fulfilling this 
task, she depends on governments to protect the rights of her workers 
but not to do her work.
This understanding of separation of responsibility has not always 
been respected. For example, too many fathers today look to the church 
to be the primary providers of spiritual direction in their families. In 
the past the church looked to civil government to enforce its vision of 
Christian comportment in matters of belief and practice. Contrary to the 
thinking of some people, this marriage of the church and civil govern-
ment was not restricted to the Roman Catholic Church. Many leaders 
of the Reformation also used the power of the state to enforce church 
doctrine. Today a monument stands in Geneva as a testament to Michael 
Servetus, killed for his heretical views, whose death John Calvin does 
not appear to have opposed, only the manner in which it was to be car-
ried out.25
In thinking about the interdependence of the God-ordained institu-
tions, a question inevitably rises: Does the state possess the legitimate 
authority, either by its own choice or by consent of the church, to rule 
over matters pertaining to the church? This, of course, is not an idle 
question. This was a serious issue well into the late eighteenth century in 
this country. Baptists found themselves regularly persecuted by the state 
for their refusals to follow the prescribed church practices, including in-
fant baptism, and for disturbing the peace, i.e., preaching the gospel. Of 
course, we know that it was a Baptist, John Leland, who led the charge 
to write an end to these practices into the United States Constitution, 
through the First Amendment. The question is, was he correct to insist 
25. David Little tracks the development of the modern conception of separation of church 
and state in the Reformed tradition. He credits Calvin himself for much of the confusion of 
later Reformers on the relationship between the two. He notes that, while Calvin stipulated 
a clear separation between the two on matters of internal faith, he considered false doctrine 
and impious behavior as a threat to the civil order, for which the civil magistrate was respon-
sible. Consequently, the civil magistrate had a mandate to secure the peace, which included 
jurisdiction over external faith practices that it considered dangerous to this peace. David 
Little, “Reformed Faith and Religious Liberty,” Church and Society (May/June 1986), 9. Perez 
Zagorin credits Calvin’s complicity in the execution of Servetus as the impetus for Sebastian 
Castellio’s anonymously published 1553 work, Concerning Heretics and Whether They Should 
Be Persecuted. He calls it “one of the first great protests in the sixteenth century against the 
persecution of heresy and a landmark in the struggle for religious toleration.” Perez Zagorin, 
How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003), 103.
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on the separation of the state from the church? Scripture supports this 
position.
The only possible way someone can argue that the church can rely 
on civil authorities to enforce its doctrines and to punish error is to apply 
to the church Old Testament teachings intended for Israel. Obviously, 
Israel was a theocracy. She had judges, governors, a king, and an army. 
God had stipulated death for a number of errant beliefs and practices 
within this community, and the Old Testament acknowledges that the 
sentence of death was carried out.
If the church is the continuation or replacement for the theocracy of 
Israel, then it is possible to argue that the church can employ the power 
of the state to enforce its views. However, there are many evidences 
that this is not the case. First, Jesus intimated that the church was a 
new thing, not to be equated with Israel. In Matthew 16:17–19, he said 
he would build his church on Peter’s confession. The church was not a 
continuation of the old but something entirely new. Second, Jesus dis-
couraged the use of physical force to protect himself. He declared that 
his kingdom was not of “this world” (John 18:36). Therefore, it was 
inappropriate to use the powers of this world to its benefit. Third, the 
church has two offices, pastor and deacon. These offices are spiritual in 
nature, not civil. There is no army, no king, no civil magistrate within 
the church structure. Consequently, there is no structure provided in 
Scripture for the use of physical force to advance the work of the church 
or to defend it.
It seems clear that there was only one theocracy—Israel. The church 
is an entirely new organism. Therefore, one cannot apply the religious 
state model of Israel to the church or to the state. The church and the 
state are separate entities, addressing different aspects of human life. 
Each supports the other but is not tasked with doing the other’s work. 
Jesus put it simply: “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s; and 
to God the things that are God’s” (Matt. 22:21 NASB; see also Mark 
12:17; Luke 20:25).
This central truth was a crucial component in the thinking of John 
Locke. Locke was strongly opposed to the union of the state and the 
church. He made the same argument I have made here: the civil magis-
trate and the church have different tasks, and they are not to be relegated 
to the other or assumed by the other. In considering the relationship be-
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tween faith and the state and the bearing of Israel on the subject, Locke 
commented: 
The laws established [in Israel] concerning the worship 
of One Invisible Deity were the civil laws of that people 
and a part of their political government, in which God 
Himself was the legislator. Now, if any one can show me 
where there is a commonwealth at this time, constituted 
upon that foundation, I will acknowledge that the eccle-
siastical laws do there unavoidably become a part of the 
civil, and that the subjects of that government both may 
and ought to be kept in strict conformity with that church 
by the civil power. But there is absolutely no such thing 
under the Gospel as a Christian commonwealth.26
Today much of the discussion of religious liberty takes place with-
in the context of the Christian faith because Christians are under ex-
treme pressure to limit their activities in the United States and around 
the world. But religious liberty does not apply only to Christianity. 
Religious liberty extends to all people and all faiths or no faiths. Jesus 
sent his disciples into all the world to make disciples, but their meth-
od was to make disciples by teaching others to observe all that he had 
taught them (Matt. 28:19–20). There is no hint in the Great Commission 
that Jesus expected his disciples to coerce true faith or to stop people 
from practicing false religion.
The Vatican “Declaration” agrees. It states, “From the very origins of 
the Church the disciples of Christ strove to convert men to faith in Christ 
as the Lord—not, however, by the use of coercion or by devices unwor-
thy of the gospel, but by the power, above all, of the Word of God.” The 
declaration cites both 1 Corinthians 2:3–5 and 1 Thessalonians 2:3–5 in 
support.27
If ever there was an opportunity to force true faith on others, it 
was during Israel’s days as a kingdom, complete with a king and an 
army. Yet whenever God wanted to get the attention of the surround-
ing nations, he didn’t call on the kings of Israel to send in their armies; 
he called prophets to go and preach repentance. Jonah is the perfect 
26. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950), 43.
27. “Declaration on Religious Freedom,” 1965.
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 example of this. The Assyrians were a wicked people. They needed to 
repent. They certainly needed to believe in the true God. Yet, knowing 
what the stakes were—God’s wrath or his mercy—God sent Jonah to 
preach. The people had to decide based on an appeal.
Some may object that God certainly instructed the Israelites to wipe 
out all the pagans in Canaan when they took possession of the land. That 
is true, but we must remember, first of all, that this was the fulfillment of 
a judgment God had determined long before then (Gen. 15:16). Second, 
God was establishing a theocracy with Israel. It is entirely within the 
nature of a theocracy to use the power of the state to eradicate error if it 
chooses to do so.
In conclusion, there is ample theological support for the doctrine of 
religious liberty. Two questions remain, however. First, does religious 
liberty apply only to the freedom of people to believe certain things but 
not to express them in public or possibly even in private? The Bible does 
not present any theological model for the right of the state to restrict reli-
gious speech or public or private practice. The only instances where the 
Bible describes state-sanctioned efforts to regulate spiritual life, outside 
of the theocratic government of Israel, are negative. Jesus was executed 
under the auspices of the Roman government. The apostles were jailed 
and otherwise persecuted, even executed under the authority of the state 
because of their religious practices. The book of Revelation describes 
a time in the future when people of faith will once again be persecuted 
under the auspices of the state for their beliefs and practices.
The early church recognized the power the state possessed to punish 
evil and reward good (Rom. 13:1–5), and the Bible calls on Christians 
to honor the civil authorities and obey them (1 Pet. 2:13–17). The early 
church also recognized that the state had the power to punish them for 
their beliefs and practices, but they did not believe they were bound to 
obey the government when its dictates violated their spiritual calling. 
For example, the apostles were brought before the civil authorities and 
told to stop preaching about Jesus. Rather than accept this requirement, 
they responded with the famous statement, “We must obey God rather 
than men” (Acts 5:29).
H. Richard Niebuhr answered the question of the state’s ability to 
interfere in matters of faith. He stated, “Religion, so understood, lies 
beyond the provenance of the state not because it is a private, incon-
sequential, or other-worldly matter but because it concerns men’s al-
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legiance to a sovereignty and a community more immediate, more in-
clusive, and more fateful than those of the political commonwealth.”28 
A. F. Carillo de Albornoz actually reversed the argument of separation 
of church and state. He commented:
 Now, it seems that it would be extremely difficult to find 
in the Christian revelation the precise limits of civil author-
ity concerning man in virtue of the State’s nature. On the 
contrary, Christian revelation does show us that man, as he 
has been created, redeemed and called by God and as God 
intends to deal with him, is responsible solely to God and 
that, therefore, the State, which is subordinated to God’s 
authority and laws, must respect this human responsibility 
before God. Consequently, in thinking this way, religious 
liberty would not be ultimately based on the limitation of 
political authority but, inversely, the latter would flow from 
the freedoms which God has given man.29
A second question is if religious liberty applies also to public expres-
sions, can legitimate limitations be placed on these freedoms by third 
parties, for example, governments? Writers, dissidents, and scholars 
have addressed this question numerous times. Carillo de Albornoz not-
ed that the Vatican Declaration usually referred to religious freedom in 
the singular, but in reality it was proclaiming “many religious freedoms: 
freedoms exercised by different classes of people—organizations, fami-
lies, individuals—or involving different activities—preaching, teach-
ing, witnessing, etc.”30 He argues that each of these contexts requires a 
separate treatment since they can infringe on other social conventions. 
At times he argues that religious freedoms must give way to other rights 
within the community.
Philip Wogaman agrees with Carillo’s categorization of religious 
freedoms, but he differs with him on the abridgement of those freedoms 
when they interfere with other rights. He provides three useful catego-
ries of religious freedom and then discusses briefly how the intersection 
28. H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1960), 70–71.
29. A. F. Carillo de Albornoz, The Basis of Religious Liberty (New York: Association Press, 
1963), 87.
30. A. F. Carillo de Albornoz, Religious Liberty (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1967), 13–14.
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of other rights might affect their exercise. “Absolute religious liberty” is 
the internal freedom to believe and worship as one pleases. “Qualified 
absolute religious liberty” is the freedom to profess or to express one’s 
faith verbally through social communication. He calls this a qualified 
liberty because “a case must be made for limiting speech which is not 
designed as communication of faith, knowledge, or opinion but as mali-
cious slander or incitement to action of an illegal sort.” “Qualified reli-
gious liberty” is the freedom to act in accordance with one’s religious 
insights and values. He says this kind of liberty “raises problems” when 
it is made into an absolute. Issues like withholding medication for re-
ligious reasons, education of children, and activities that harm other 
people require that this liberty be restricted in some manner.31
These are not only useful distinctions; they are reasonable. As we 
make claims for religious liberty and fight for them with zeal, we must 
keep in mind that humans are still fallen, and some will abuse any lib-
erty. This could unfortunately result in the restriction of legitimate reli-
gious liberties as authorities attempt to deal with the impact of the ille-
gitimate exercise of religious liberty toward others. That said, however, 
we must always be mindful of what is at stake when we are dealing with 
religious liberty. Faith is the principal point of connection between God 
and man. Through faith, people commune with God, learn his will, and 
act in the world in response to him. What one government may decide is 
inappropriate religious behavior because it interferes with the life of the 
community may be a perfectly legitimate behavior in the eyes of God.
For example, China is currently engaged in a brutal policy of re-
pression of the house church movement. The government believes that 
these groups pose a real threat to order. To the degree that these house 
churches encourage freedom of thought, the government has reason to 
be concerned since the Bible will lead men to desire freedom from tyr-
anny and oppression. Yet in this case we must do all we can to assert the 
right of these Christians to engage in this legitimate expression of their 
faith. Whenever anyone claims a legitimate right to abridge the religious 
liberty of another, it is incumbent upon that one to prove that his inter-
ests are greater than the God-given right of those affected to believe and 
practice their faith according to the dictates of their conscience.
31. Philip Wogaman, Protestant Faith and Religious Liberty (Nashville: Abingdon, 1967), 
182–90.
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In conclusion, I reiterate that many men and women have contrib-
uted in significant ways to our current understanding of religious liberty, 
often at the expense of their lives. Many have made their statements 
about this topic in powerful and instructive ways. But I believe it would 
be difficult to find a more succinct statement of the Christian doctrine 
of religious liberty than that found in the Baptist Faith and Message. 
Article 17 reads:
God alone is Lord of the conscience, and He has left it 
free from the doctrines and commandments of men which 
are contrary to His Word or not contained in it. Church 
and state should be separate. The state owes to every 
church protection and full freedom in the pursuit of its 
spiritual ends. In providing for such freedom no ecclesi-
astical group or denomination should be favored by the 
state more than others. Civil government being ordained 
of God, it is the duty of Christians to render loyal obedi-
ence thereto in all things not contrary to the revealed will 
of God. The church should not resort to the civil power 
to carry on its work. The gospel of Christ contemplates 
spiritual means alone for the pursuit of its ends. The state 
has no right to impose penalties for religious opinions of 
any kind. The state has no right to impose taxes for the 
support of any form of religion. A free church in a free 
state is the Christian ideal, and this implies the right of 
free and unhindered access to God on the part of all men, 
and the right to form and propagate opinions in the sphere 
of religion without interference by the civil power.
Genesis 1:27; 2:7; Matthew 6:6–7,24; 16:26; 22:21; John 
8:36; Acts 4:19–20; Romans 6:1–2; 13:1–7; Galatians 
5:1,13; Philippians 3:20; 1 Timothy 2:1–2; James 4:12; 
1 Peter 2:12–17; 3:11–17; 4:12–19.
